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I’ll tell you what I see here, Sims.  The scenery of the future.  Eventually the only scenery left.  The 
more toxic the waste, the greater the effort and expense a tourist will be willing to tolerate in order to 
visit the site.  Only I don’t think you ought to be isolating these sites. Isolate the toxic sites, okay.  This 
makes it grander, more ominous and magical.  But basic household waste ought to be placed in the 
cities that produce it.  Bring garbage out into the open.  Let people see it and respect it.  Don’t hide 
your waste facilities.  Make an architecture of waste.  Design gorgeous buildings to recycle waste and 
invite people to collect their own garbage and bring it with them to the press rams and conveyors.  Get 
to know your garbage.  And the hot stuff, the chemical waste, the nuclear waste, this becomes a 
remote landscape of nostalgia.  Bus tours and postcards, I guarantee it. (Don DeLillo, Underworld, 
2000, p.286) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1979 Wallerstein drew up a comprehensive list of countries deemed ‘semi-peripheral’:2 Portugal and 
Spain, Greece and Turkey, Brazil and Mexico, Canada and Australia, and “most of Eastern Europe” 
were all there but not Ireland.  However, according to most definitions the Republic of Ireland would be 
a textbook case of semi-peripherality.  The semi-periphery was at first a residual category, a part of 
the intermediate zone between the core and the periphery of the world system.  It was seen as a 
transitional stage of development from which a country could progress ‘upwards’ or ‘downwards’ in the 
world-system hierarchy.  Later 3 the semi-periphery was redefined as a permanent and stable part of 
the global economy, now seen as tri-modal and not as a simple core-periphery binary opposition.  
However, despite this necessary clarification, ‘semi-periphery’ remains a contested concept for a 
number of reasons.4  
 
The great diversity of states that at one time or another have been dubbed semi-peripheral raises the 
issue of conceptual clarity and consistency.  The conventional definition of semi-periphery used 
hitherto is based on the balance of economic activities between industrial goods and primary products, 
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categorizations with less salience in the ‘information society’.  However, the concept could be updated 
in terms of the balance between ‘intellectual’ and ‘execution’ activities carried out by transnational 
corporations in different locations, for example in relation to the global ‘telecommunications sector’.  
Then we would also need to distinguish between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ semi-peripherality:  
Australia and Ireland may in economic terms enter this category but they are not in the same ‘political’ 
category of semi-peripherality as, say, Pakistan or Indonesia.  Then we would need to specify the 
political implications of the category.  Chase-Dunn has focused on the semi-periphery as the ‘weak 
link’ of the world system and the locus of transformative social movements.5  Wallerstein has, since his 
earlier writings on the topic, focused on the “concentration of state-oriented political activity” 6 in the 
semi-peripheral nation-states. Taking up the more ‘relational’ definition of semi-periphery as 
articulated in the introduction to this special issue I propose to examine whether semi-peripherality has 
a specific effect in Ireland’s waste management and on resistance to government plans and 
strategies. 
 
The economic development of Ireland has, on the whole, been studied from a modernization 
perspective.  A few voices7 did introduce a broadly dependency theory influenced perspective, but the 
concept of semi-peripherality was more implicit than explicit in these accounts. However, Ireland is 
clearly a case of semi-peripherality broadly understood, not a core country, and still suffering from the 
legacies of colonialism, but no anymore a classic case of dependency à la Gunder Frank.  Dennis O’ 
Hearn notes that while “Ireland’s narrow dependence on American TNCs makes a return to the dark 
days of the 1980’s a strong possibility”, it was still the case that  “[s]everal years of rapid economic 
growth have brought very real changes to the South of Ireland”.8  That is to say, we need to 
understand the accelerated economic development of the 1990’s and beyond in terms of Ireland’s 
semi-peripherality, rather than its magical transformation into core member of the new global 
economy.  One would be tempted to say that Ireland is not a ‘globalizer’ although it has clearly been 
‘globalized’.  When Ireland joined the European Union in 1973 it began to grow away from the semi-
colonial relationship it still maintained with Britain at the economic level, only to become an integral 
part of the expanding U.S. economy in Western Europe, keen to establish a foothold in semi-
peripheral locations such as Ireland.  By joining the Euro-zone the Irish economy is effectively tied in 
to the pattern of development set by the core European economies.  On the other hand, economic 
dependence on the US has dramatically increased in recent years with the emergence of the ‘new 
economy’ based on the pharmaceutical and computing industries.  So much so that Damien Kiberd, 
economic editor of the establishment Sunday Times can now declare in an uncontroversial manner 
that: “The Irish economy is now little more than a branch economy of the United States.  It is hugely 
dependent on the trading climate in corporate America and the flow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI)”.9  In this context the undoubted economic boom in Ireland over the last decade begins to look 
more fragile insofar as it is almost totally dependent on the evolution of the US economy. 
 
While the concept of semi-peripherality thus serves to situate Ireland structurally in the global system, 
it has certain limitations.  The concept in its classic manifestations is rather static and state-centric in 
its optic.  Recently Ireland has been analysed more in terms of the interactions between culture, 
society and the global economy10 with the concept of ‘hybridity’ coming to the fore, even amongst 
analysts who had previously analysed Ireland in terms of dependent development11. This more ‘post-
structuralist’ and culturally aware perspective is a necessary supplement to more economistic 
renderings of semi-peripherality.  The Republic is an integral part of the economic flows and 
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instabilities created by the vastly accelerated process of economic internationalization over the last 
decade.  Ireland is a ‘branch economy’ of the U.S., but it is also a ‘place’ with ‘local’ issues and 
political struggles.  Yet these places can only be conceived, I would argue, through a ‘glocal’ lens that 
merges the local and the global in a new hybrid socio-economic formation12.  In methodological terms, 
the largely disembodied ‘global’ studies and the detailed ethnographic ‘local’ studies could thus be 
superseded by a new mode of ‘critical grounded’ study of the ‘glocal’.  The rather diffuse concept of 
the ‘glocal’ does not displace that of semi-periphery, but rather acts as a bridging concept that 
incorporates the global structural elements of semi-peripheral analysis, with local ethnographic place-
based analysis.  The growing waste management crisis in Ireland is a seemingly inevitable by-product 
of the recent economic boom.  In this way Ireland is seen to be a semi-periphery where usually 
economic dynamism is not matched by effective regulation and ecological degradation inevitably 
ensues.  The pernicious ecological effects of the ‘Celtic Tiger’s’ neo-liberalism are most evident in its 
production and circulation of waste. A waste management crisis is one unintended (and fast spiralling 
out of control) outcome of its very recent economic success.  Attempts to manage this waste 
management crisis have been centre-stage in local politics throughout the Republic over the past two 
years and it is to this ‘crisis’ that this article turns its attention.   
 
In social theory waste can perhaps be seen as a ‘lost continent’, a long way behind production and 
consumption in terms of analysis and understanding. It is only recently that we see the beginnings of a 
‘sociology of waste’ 13or a ‘political economy of waste’.14   I have recently collaborated on an all-Ireland 
empirical study of waste management15 and in this article I focus specifically on the geo-political 
situation of the regulation and management of waste in the Republic of Ireland.  This article examines 
globalized networks of waste and globalized waste management networks as they impact this semi-
periphery site.  It looks at the competing actors that play a role in the governance of waste and 
analyses the move towards a waste management strategy in terms of who is empowered or 
disempowered. It analyses the competing discourses of neo-liberalism and Green politics as they play 
themselves out in the particularly intense ‘glocalized’ contestation of waste management plans.  
 
By focusing on waste and its governance in the Republic of Ireland we can shed light on a particularly 
intense arena of conflict and contestation where the global neo-liberal agenda has come into direct 
confrontation with the needs of ecology and democracy.  From this space and place in the semi-
periphery we can build insights into networks of wasting and the networked political processes of 
waste governance.  How neo-liberalism has impacted waste governance, what other ideologies have 
impacted on it, who has promoted these ideologies, and how successful resistance to a neo-liberal 
agenda has been are some of the questions I will address in this article. In order to answer these 
questions I will, firstly, examine the proposition that waste is a ‘glocal’ fluid, that is global and local at 
one and the same time.  Secondly, I will examine the state’s involvement in the development of a 
waste management strategy, the competing discourses informing its actions and its politics in terms of 
its adherence to notions of democracy.  In particular I seek to assess whether Ireland’s semi-
peripheral condition leads to a particular lack of state control over environmental regulation.  Finally, I 
will examine community action against incineration in terms of the nature of the resistance offered, 
how it is generated and its possible impact.  This is related to the broader theoretical and political 
question of whether semi-peripherality creates the conditions for greater popular resistance in terms of 
both motive and opportunity. 
 
2. WASTE AS GLOCAL FLUID 
 
Waste is part of global networks that are material, technical, social and discursive.  Of particular 
interest is the fact that waste poses sharply the issue of regulation in a global economy where the 
dominant discourse is deregulatory and in favor of ‘free market’ operations. A network can be defined 
as a set of inter-connected nodes, a dynamic and flexible open structure, and the global economy is 
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connected by ‘global commodity chains’16.  The environmental/waste issue, while it can be seen to be 
subject to commodity/care chains, is perhaps best conceptualised as a ‘global fluid’.  Those are, 
according to Urry, “flows or waves of people, information, objects, images, risk and networks across 
regions in heterogeneous, uneven, unpredictable and often unplanned shapes”.17  Waste is a global 
fluid, but it is usually invisible, deemed unproductive and certainly not well researched.   
 
Waste could be conceptualized as a globally circulating fluid, its production and management 
governed well beyond the nation state.  A recent study on globalization and the environment sees 
environmental flows as particularly global:  “[t]his is particularly true for flows related to the 
environment:  greenhouse gases, ozone threatening gases and toxic wastes move from more 
developed to less developed countries; raw materials and commodities, produced a huge 
environmental costs flow from less developed to more developed countries”.18  In the 1980’s, the 
ecological debate shifted from the national to the global terrain.  This debate focused on the ‘limits to 
growth’, the need for production to be ‘sustainable’ and for consumption to be cut back.  The 
Chernobyl disaster of 1986 brought home in a dramatic way the transnational characteristics of 
ecology.  The Rio ‘Earth Summit’ of 1992 may have produced the international declaration, but it was 
Chernobyl (and Seveso) that produced a real social understanding of the biosphere as a single 
integrated whole.  As Robin Murray puts it:   
 
As environmental concerns came to the fore in the 1990’s, all roads led to waste.  From 
centuries of obscurity the waste industry found itself at the hub of environmental argument.19 
 
Ironically, as the wave of international neo-liberal economics was peaking, the government’s response 
to the environmental threat, and waste in particular, was to increase and strengthen environmental 
and waste regulations.  Waste emerged from obscurity to threaten the consistency and symmetry of 
the dominant neo-liberal discourse insofar as to make waste profitable it needed to be regulated. 
 
Waste has broken down the limits of natural earth, and its risk factors are multiplying.  Wasting is 
likewise posing regulatory dramas and its flows are recognized as well out of control.  In Europe the 
Environmental Agency presents the chaotic scenario: 
 
The expected waste trends during the outlook period [up to 2005] suggest that existing 
policies, although providing some degree of success, will not be sufficient to stabilize waste 
arising, meet policy objectives, or progress towards sustainability.20 
 
In the waste categories more familiar to the domestic consumer such as paper, cardboard, glass and 
plastic, proposed recycling sustainable efforts offer only a partial solution.  Many countries have 
adopted increased recycling, but according to the European Environmental Agency, the development 
“has been only a partial success, because the total amount of waste paper and waste glass (container 
glass) generation has also increased in the same period.21  The sheer material quantity of waste in 
circulation is extraordinary. The European Environmental Agency’s statistics on the European Union 
for 1999 show 2000 million tonnes of waste being generated per year and that the amount has 
increased by ten per cent each of the previous six years.  It estimates that all waste streams will 
continue to increase steadily.22 
 
                                                 
16 Garry Gereffi, “The organization of buyer-driven global commodity chains: How US retailers shape overseas production” in 
Garry Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds) Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Connecitut: Praeger, 1994) pp.95-122. 
 
17 John Urry, J  “Time, Complexity and the Global” published by the Department of Sociology, Lancaster University at: 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc057ju.html 2000. p.5 
18 John Urry,  “Global Citizenship and the Environment: An ESRC funded research project” published by the Department of 
Sociology, Lancaster University at: http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/jures.html, 1999 
19 Robin Murray Creating Wealth from Waste. (London: Demos, 1999) p.20. 
20 European Environment Agency Environment in the European Union at the Turn of the Century (Luxemburg: EC Publications, 
1999) p.215 
21 Ibid., p.203.   
22 Ibid.,  
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Contemporary patterns of waste flows are historically unprecedented.  Trade in toxic wastes occurs at 
the transnational level, with toxic wastes changing hands between the global North and the global 
South world in profitable and usually environmentally hazardous ways.23  The emergence of any form 
of regulation is very new in that before the 1970s the free market criteria of ‘produce what you want so 
long as you can make a profit’, prevailed unquestioned.  Most Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries did not even have an analytical or legal framework for 
distinguishing between different types of waste.  In Foucaultian terms, without definition, without 
naming, without statistical information, the regulation of waste was simply impossible.   
 
Waste scandals such as the Love Canal incident in the USA and the BT Chemie scandals in Sweden 
brought about the definition of certain wastes as hazardous24 and so created the possibilities for its 
regulation.  Governance moves were made at the global level to create a common global list of agreed 
hazardous wastes, and interestingly it has in fact been the regulation of these that has been a ‘driving 
force’ behind establishing profitability of the international trade in hazardous waste.25  The regulation 
of waste is approached from many other spheres of governance.  The global sphere deals particularly 
with hazardous and toxic wastes.  At a European level, nation states are now required to manage 
waste under specific European guidelines, which must be adhered to under pain of severe financial 
penalties.  It is this naming and differentiation between wastes, and the shift towards their regulation 
that has established a profitable market for waste.   
 
The material quantity of the waste circulating in the Republic of Ireland is equally astonishing to those 
blinded to the social process of wasting. Like in all European Union countries, the quantity is 
increasing all the time. However, in the Republic of Ireland there is an above average growth rate in its 
production due to the economic boom of the ‘Celtic Tiger’.  Between 1995 and 1998, waste flows in 
Ireland increased by a phenomenal 89%.  Most of this waste (currently 91% of municipal waste and 
85% of industrial waste) is ‘disposed’ of through landfill, which is clearly the most environmentally risky 
option.26  However, being grounded, of course, does not block its continuous circulation as 
environmental scientists and community residents beside landfill sites testify.  Hazardous wastes are 
also shipped out of the country to other European sites. 
 
While we can see waste as a global fluid, with risk and profitability associated with its movement, so 
too can we conceptualize it as being locally networked at the most micro level.  If we start at the local 
site of the individual and their waste bin, we can see that each person in the Republic of Ireland is 
‘producing’ practically double the European average of one kilogram of municipal waste per day.  The 
Irish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)27 estimates that every citizen of the Republic is 
producing an average of 600kg of waste a year.  In doing so they are actively engaged in relating to a 
social process and social relations of wasting through their pattern of consumption.  Customers 
purchase what has been produced in the format it is being produced in. Citizens have some choice in 
this area as some ways of consuming, and some forms of consumption are more environmentally 
‘friendly’ than others, but, by and large, consumerism is organized along lines more concerned with 
profitability than with a sustainable environment.  Can the individual consumer be interpellated as an 
environmentally concerned consumer and can some or all markets respond to this trend?28 We are left 
with the fact that on average the contents of the waste bin are becoming greater, there are more of 
them, and there are things in them that are worse for the environment that ever before.   While the 
individual may not be producing the hair spray canister, the plastic tractor or the twenty-one so-called 
‘disposable’ nappies (surely a misnomer for something that simply cannot be got rid of and takes 
                                                 
23Greenpeace, The International Trade in Toxic Wastes: An International Inventory  (Washington: Greenpeace International, 
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24 David Held,  Anthony Mc Grew, David Goldblatt  and  Jonathan Perraton 1999 Global Transformations: Politics, Economics 
and Culture  (Cambridge: Polity, 1999) p.407. 
25 Ibid., p.408  
26 Environmental Protection Agency  Environment in Focus, 2002: Key Environmental Indicators for Ireland. 9 (Dublin: 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2002) 
27 Ibid. 
28 See the debates in Timothy Luke “Green Consumerism: Ecology And The Use Of Recycling”, in Ecocritique, (University of 
Minnesotta Press, 1977). 
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longer to decompose than the old cloth nappies) they are playing a role in its wasting.  In other words, 
the consumption pattern of the household results in the waste bin, acknowledging that this could be a 
very different waste bin if the forces of production were regulated into producing less wasteful and 
environmentally damaging commodities. 
 
The organization of the waste bin once filled is that it is ‘put out’ (colloquial term for placing bins 
outside the household for collection), to be dealt with at sub-state regional and national level, where its 
malign geographic footprint becomes more visible on the Irish environment.  Its management at this 
point becomes part of a governance network:  Who are the actors, the key players and what are the 
key ‘drivers’ embedded in these governing networks? In taking a “grounded and processual” 
approach29 to the development of Irish waste management strategy as a social effect we have begun 
to answer these questions.30  Given that waste is a material outcome of globalized consumerism and 
‘development’, who are the key players in its management?  Who governs, regulates and strategises 
waste flows in the semi-peripheral site of Ireland? 
 
 
3. REGIMES OF GOVERNANCE: EU AND THE NATION-STATE 
 
In the study we carried out31 there was very little doubt as to who were the key actors when 
respondents were presented with a range of possible ‘players’.  EU governance was considered to be 
the key driver, and there is very little doubt that this is indeed the case.  In this sense also Ireland’s 
semi-peripherality is clear insofar as key decisions are made by the European Union, itself dominated 
by the larger core capitalist states such as Britain, Germany and France. The European Economic 
Community (EC) Act of 1972 gave ‘direct effect’ to European acts over domestic laws and 
constitutional provisions in the Republic and in Northern Ireland.  The ratification of the Single 
European Act (1986), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) further 
ensured the supremacy of EU law over domestic law.  EU legislation includes Directives on dangerous 
substances, waste oils, groundwater, urban waste water, licensing regulations, the disposal of 
PCB/PCT, toxic waste, sewage sludge in agriculture, emissions from waste incineration plants, the 
disposal of animal waste, and batteries containing dangerous fluids.  The extent of the national input is 
that at European level they participate in the discussion and the decision-making, given that the EU is 
a network made up of nation states.  Then, when the Directives are in place, the nation state, in their 
own jurisdiction, has some leeway with the ‘how and when’ of implementation.  While EU Directives do 
set out a stated time period for implementation, it is essentially up to individual member states to 
decide how the individual Directive is to be given effect. Directives, therefore, are not directly or 
immediately applicable to domestic law. However, failure to implement a Directive within the given 
period of time can result in a member state being penalized by the European Court of Justice. Early 
EU Directives were of particular relevance to the formation of Irish and UK government policies on 
waste management including Council Directive 75/442/EEC – July 1975, which states that member 
states must encourage steps that prevent and minimize waste flows. These include recycling and the 
extraction of raw materials and energy for re-use of waste (Article 3). It also notes that Member States 
must ensure that waste is disposed of “without endangering human health and without harming the 
environment, and in particular: - without risk to water, soil, and plants and animals, without causing a 
nuisance through noise or odours, without adversely affecting the countryside or places of special 
interest” (Article 4). Thus the ‘green’ quality of the regulations is firmly in place. 
 
This Directive was later reinforced to ensure that the EU as a whole, and member states individually, 
must aim towards self-sufficiency in waste disposal (Article 5, Council Directive 91/156/EEC (March 
1991) amendment to Directive 75/442/EEC). Furthermore, the EU wanted the establishment of ‘a 
competent authority’ in order to plan, authorize and supervise waste disposal operations (Article 5). 
This plan was to include the type and quantity of waste, suitable disposal sites, costs, and “appropriate 
measures to encourage rationalization, of the collection, sorting and treatment of waste” (Article 6). 
The authority was also charged with issuing permits to those who store or tip waste on behalf of a third 
party (Article 8), and was to ensure that the conditions of the permit are fulfilled thereafter. As a 
                                                 
29 Sarah Radcliffe,  “Development, the State and Transnational Connections: State and Subject Formations in Latin America,” 
Global Networks, Vol. 1, No.1, 2001, pp. 19-37. 
30Fagan et al, op cit.  
31 Ibid. 
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sanction against default, waste costs would be in accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle (Article 
11). 
 
So the EU is a key player in that it has set about the regulation of waste.  The EU legislation impacts 
on the development of strategy at the national level.32  EU policy emerges from a network of actors 
and competing agendas.  In the regulation of waste we can clearly see the agenda informed by 
sustainable environment concerns.  This legislation clearly reflects networked green politics, but at the 
European level the contradiction between the concepts of development (market-driven in its capitalist 
form) and sustainability (the earth as limited resource) are also played out.   
 
Moving from European level to the nation state level it is necessary to examine the current debate on 
the nature of the contemporary state, which is directly relevant to the analysis of the state’s role in 
waste management strategy.  Philip Cerny argues that there is a ‘competition state’ driving 
globalization on, and eroding the ‘inside-outside’ the nation-state distinction.33  The state is 
transformed, but its much-vaunted death proclaimed in early globalization studies has not occurred.  
Carnoy and Castells34 also show how far we have come from the classic 1970’s statement of Marxist 
state theory by Nicos Poulantzas.  They argue that the state can now best be described as a ‘network 
state’, just one player among others when it comes to state control of knowledge and information.  
Globalization, time space-compression and the information society have created a new ‘network 
state’: “made of shared institutions, and enacted by bargaining and interactive iteration all along the 
chain of decision making”35 from the supranational to local government and NGO’s.   According to 
them decision-making and representation take place all along the chain, not necessarily in the 
hierarchical pre-scripted order.  The new state “functions as a network in which all nodes interact, and 
are equally necessary for the performance of the state’s functions”.36 
 
While Carnoy and Castells assert that all nodes are equally necessary but the development of waste 
management strategy would suggest that some nodes are distinctly ‘more equal than others’. With the 
EU able to enforce sanctions on the nation state and the national governments needing to radically 
change the waste flows, the drawing up and implementing of strategy quickly becomes an issue of 
governance in the networked society.  As Stoker puts it, “governance recognizes the blurring of 
boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues”.37  Both in terms of strategic 
decision-making and of service delivery there is a widespread turn away from the hierarchical 
Westminster model of decision-making and government to a more networked model of governance 
more in-line with the complex networked societies we live in.  In terms of waste management strategy, 
government by central decree would be an impossibility.  Governments thus attempt to move to a 
strategy based on a more consensual model based on multi-agency partnerships.  Self-governing 
networks in relation to waste management would, from this perspective, be much favored.  The 
‘capacity to get things done’ does not simply rest on the power of government to command and this 
will be done only in a last instance scenario.  It rests on developing new mechanisms to steer and 
guide.  Waste governance, from this perspective, will not be resolved at its most radical level of 
sustainability38 without widespread social and political consensus. For most governments in order to 
reach the targets it is considered necessary to bring key players such as ‘private enterprise’ into some 
form of partnership.  They can achieve this with a ‘stick’ if necessary, as they are the body responsible 
for regulating waste production, but in line with the governance strategy the preferred option would be 
to achieve this with a ‘carrot’ approach.  Current Minister for the Environment, Martin Cullen, is 
                                                 
32 On the local implementation ‘deficit’ in Ireland see Anthony Quinlivan, “European Standards and Waste Management in 
Ireland: Examining the Local Implementation Deficit,” Administration,  50 No.2, 2002, pp. 67-79.  
33 Phil Cerny, “Structuring the Political Arena: Public Goods, States and Governance in a Globalizing World’ in Ronen Palan(ed) 
Global Political Economy: Contemporary Themes. (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.21-35. 
34Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells, “Globalization , The Knowledge Society And The Network State” Global Networks, Vol.1, 
No.1, 2001, pp.1-19.  
35 Ibid., p.14 
36 Ibid. 
37 Gerry Stoker, “Governance As Theory: Five Propositions”, Journal of International Social Science, 155, March, 1998, p.21. 
38 Of course sustainability can be interpreted in a number of ways, from token or minimalist definitions through to a radical ‘zero 
waste’ definition taken by authors such as Robin Murray, Zero Waste (Greenpeace Environmental Trust, 2002)or the ‘aesthetic 
of sustainability’ as advocated by Kate Sopher, “Nature Prospect”, Capitalism, Nature and Society, Vol.14, No. 2, June, 2003). 
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seeking initiatives from the private sector to reduce waste going to landfill but declares, “Where 
initiatives are not forthcoming, I will not hesitate to regulate”.39 
 
The development of waste management strategy at the national level does point to the state as 
networked.  It is in fact the transnational politics of EU policy that has forced the nation state to carry 
out policies in this case.  There was widespread consensus across the spectrum of waste 
management ‘actors’ that “[w]aste management began to be driven more and more by the EU.  The 
EU demanded that we manage our landfills better, they demanded an end to pollution”.40 It is also 
evident that the policy built at European level was fed into by the nation state, but also influenced by a 
transnational environmentalist movement. In our study the environmentalists, the environmental 
scientists, the environmentally minded politicians were extremely happy with the EU Directives.  They 
were considered to contain an “alternative world view” on “sustainable development” which had, at 
least in part, come by the “drive of civil society and NGO’s” concerned with environmental issues.41  
So there is no doubt that the state functions more like a node in a network, charged with implementing 
EU Directives at national and local level, rather than as a centralized Head Quarters. 
 
EU policy on waste is, indeed, partially driven by civil society in the form of the environmental 
movement, but that policy implementation is opposed at the local level by the same elements of civil 
society with many of the same environmental concerns that drove policy in the first place. Our all-
Ireland waste study points to the state acting to ‘filter out’ those elements of the EU policy that are 
seen as more threatening to powerful interest groups.  State strategies such as ‘individualization’ 
(where domestic householder’s waste was emphasized over and above agricultural and industrial 
waste), and marketization (where they try to make the final waste product ‘profitable’) were seen to 
have been employed.  They were present in the discourse of all of the players in the waste 
management strategy, even in that of those most radical environmentalists who would wish to 
emphasize sustainability over profitability.42  When it comes to the implementation of these Directives 
at national level, the tension played out is most certainly between questions of sustainability (which 
regions and localities seem to be pushing more than the state) and questions of profitability (spoken 
for by industry and increasingly spoken for by the state). The question of financing the infrastructure 
for dealing with waste at national level appears to be the most urgent side of the equation at the 
national level in order to meet EU waste targets. 
 
 
4. DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSES AND ‘GLOCAL’ STRUGGLES 
 
Waste is a global fluid and therefore a global issue, but it is also clearly a local issue.  So, as already 
mentioned, I shall deploy the concept of the ‘glocal’.  According to Dirlik “‘Glocal’ expresses cogently 
what Latour has in mind by the hybridity of the global and the local. What it forces us to think about is 
a double process at work in shaping the world: the localization of the global, and the globalization of 
the local”43.  That is to say that waste is at one and the same time global and local if we wish to 
characterize it in such terms. It is created in someone’s locality and dumped or burned in a locality, yet 
it also flows around globally.  The political economy of waste can thus be seen as embedded in 
multiple and inter-locking locales.  
 
 The relation between the global and the local is never a straightforward one.  When it comes to 
analysing political action around waste management strategy from the point of view of networked 
political action, we can see a complex dynamic in play.  For some progressive (and not so 
progressive!) social or political movements, the global is, in and of itself, compared to an 
uncomplicatedly ‘good’ local level.   The global is seen as the terrain of capital while the local is the 
terrain of the people.  Yet, as Doreen Massey explains “setting up the question as local versus global 
is to accede to spatial fetishism…. Imagining that space has a political meaning…to assume that the 
                                                 
39 Quoted in Frank Mc Donald, “Minister Wants To Fast-Track Planning On Waste”, Irish Times, August 12th , 2002, p.2. 
40 Fagan et al, op cit, p.42. 
41 Ibid., p.10. 
42 Ibid., pp.41-2 
43Arif Dirlik, “Place-Based Imagination: Globalism And The Politics Of Place”, Review xxii, No.2, 1999, p.158. 
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local is always better…. This is to side step the real problem”.44   I would argue that local action is in 
fact ‘glocal’ action precisely where it is networked political action.  Political networks resemble the 
Gramscian concept of civil society in that they both enable and disable citizen participation and power.  
I read Castells in this vein when he argues that: “dominant activities in our societies are made of 
networks: Global financial markets…science and technology…the Internet as a universal, interactive 
communication network…[But] I would also add that increasingly, counter domination operates 
through networks as well…”.45 We may recall, at this point, that for Gramsci civil society was the realm 
in which the social order was grounded (‘state = political society + civil society’) but also where a new 
order could be founded through a process of social transformation.  In terms of waste, the waste 
industry is clearly a global corporate network of considerable power and dynamism.  The state is part 
of a network through the European Union. Political parties and campaigners active in the waste and 
environmental issues are also part of networks.  But the question remains as to whether they all have 
equal capacities to be agents of social change. 
 
One way of exploring these issues is through a consideration of how communities and activists 
contested the Irish government’s preferred waste management strategy of building incinerators.  In 
terms of participatory democracy the environmentalists and local communities threatened by 
incineration plans in Ireland were deeply critical of the ‘façade’ of consultation that had occurred.  They 
argued that a large element of the plan was based on sub- regional incinerators developed by a 
company of engineers for the government:  “That goes out to the public for their ‘consultation’, back 
come all these comments.  The engineering firm who have produced 90 per cent of the plans, defends 
the plan against comments, and we get nowhere”.46  We found a widespread perception that the 
government ‘consultations’ (often dictated by EU regulations) on the development of incinerators were 
simply empty rhetorical exercises for communities to ‘let off steam’ but not to change decisions 
already taken on ‘technical’ grounds. 
 
In Ireland the waste management strategy was thrown into political crisis throughout 2000-2001.  
Local communities successfully blocked the sub-regional plans.  This marked a high point in the power 
of the political action of locals embedded in a geographical community, and a low point for the nation 
state. The state, however, reacted. The Minister at the time, Noel Dempsey, removed the local 
councillor from the decision making process (who had been subject to public will), and replaced 
her/him with the county manager, a government employee.  So here, in response to challenge from 
‘below’, a central decree (government as opposed to governance) was used to achieve the localizing 
or embedding of waste management.  This is not to say that the state moved entirely back to 
traditional government, rejected consensus politics and failed to involve itself in multi-agency 
partnership, but, rather, that they removed the locality from involvement in the decision-making 
process.  The Environment Minister, Cullen, stated quite openly that the planning process on waste 
management was “over-democratized”47 and that he did not believe it was “adding anything to it by 
having so many layers involved”.48  So ‘fast-tracking’ of waste management plans had to be 
implemented, where An Board Pleánala (The Planning Board) became a ‘one-stop shop’ for assessing 
all plans for new waste management facilities.  Objectors must now raise their objections at An Board 
Pleànala hearings rather than at the local authority level. The Minister, in true Orwellian fashion, 
insists that he is not removing any groups or individual rights to express their views – “That is 
sacrosanct, but I don’t see a need for these views to be expressed at so many different levels”.49 
 
There is currently a need for an estimated investment of one billion euros, over a 3-5 year period, to 
implement the waste development plan50 and the National Development Plan envisages this coming 
from the private sector. Clearly, Ireland faces a gruelling task to organize for targets set at a five-fold 
increase in recycling and to find the finance for the infrastructure especially if the plan is for the private 
sector to answer the call.  Private capital is thus seen as a necessary ‘node’ in the governance of 
                                                 
44Doreen Massey, ‘The Geography Of Power’, Red Pepper, July, 
2000, p.8 
45Manuel Castells, “Globalization And Identity In The Network Society”, Prometheus 4, 2000, p.110. 
46 Fagan et al, op cit, p.18. 
47Quoted in Frank Mc Donald, “Minister Wants To Fast-Track Planning On Waste”, Irish Times, August 12th , 2002, p.1.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Forfás, Key Waste Management Issues in Ireland,. 2001, p. vi. 
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waste management, and of major significance to its outcome, not a dispensable partner like the local 
community. 
 
This suggests a particular multi-faceted and shifting dynamic of actors with some gaining more power 
and others losing it in a complex political process.  That local communities were important players in 
the dynamic is without question, but there were ebbs and flows in their political power.  When waste 
hit the Irish scene as an issue it was on the basis of local concerns around landfills in the early 
eighties.  This was an uphill struggle and local concerns received very limited acknowledgment from 
the state.  It was EU Directives that resolved the conflict between communities and local government 
authorities on ‘waste disposal’, not the national government.  Where before you could open a landfill 
site just by getting permission from the county council, now they had to be licensed by the new 
Agency (EPA) established to meet European Directives.  So local community opposition to landfill was 
strengthened by EU legislation and the Green argument was also strengthened and built on at local 
community level.   However, in regards to waste management strategy, environmental activists felt 
that the government “turned to incineration on the advice of one single engineering company” and 
“incineration was put into all the sub-regional plans” but not ‘up front’.51  We see how incineration is a 
contested terrain as not one government policy or sub-regional plan mentions the word ‘incineration’.  
The word used repeatedly, and pointedly, in a not so subtle discursive manoeuvre, is ‘thermal 
treatment plant’.  As in all conflicts the discourse itself marks the terrain and the use of word 
‘incineration’ as opposed to ‘thermal treatment plant’ normally marks a political divide.   
 
Thus we see democracy becoming troublesome for the Irish state.  Communities are able to stretch 
their muscles and contest globalized networks in regards to locating incineration or ‘thermal treatment’ 
plants in specific areas, but we also see how the state responds by simply enforcing its decision taken 
in the interests of capital in general and the waste management companies in particular.  Resistance 
and community action plays a key role in developing waste management strategy, but even more 
interesting from the point of view of resistance studies is that we see clearly how this action is ‘glocal’ 
in the way it was networked to global community action. In one anti-incineration campaign we 
observed the Internet being used from the very start to gain access to technical information and to 
build support from other similar groups.  From as far away as Australia and from as close as Northern 
Ireland, technical and organizing expertise flowed in.  There seemed little doubt that the participants’ 
view of the world was transformed by this experience, and while the campaign was embedded in a 
locale, it was clearly networked to the global environmental condition.  Networking on environmental 
issues has become faster and more immediate due to the ‘network society’.  Environmentalism, in the 
era of globalization, supports and stimulates direct horizontal contacts between campaigners through 
the use of cyberpolitics and cybermedia. Evidence on the ground testified to Carnoy and Castell’s 
argument that:  
 
knowledge formation and power over knowledge in the global economy is moving out of 
control of the nation state, because innovation is globalized, because discourse on 
knowledge is outside the state’s control, and because information is much more 
accessible than it was before thanks to technology and communications.52 
 
The first that one community we researched53 knew about an incineration plant being planned for their 
village was a sign in a field declaring that a planning application had been lodged.  A quick search on 
the Internet by a local teacher revealed that this company was a large waste treatment trans-national.  
Soon concerned residents came together and the local parish priest joined the campaign to stop the 
incinerator being built in their small rural community.  The government sought to portray this 
opposition as NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard) based on concerns over the value of property rather 
than the health of the children.  Undeterred the campaign built up momentum and support was 
gathered internationally through the means of the Internet.  Yet this was a very ‘local’ campaign, 
based on the ‘social capital’ resources of a tight-knit community. 
 
As one of the residents we interviewed told us:  
                                                 
51 Fagan et al, op cit, p.12. 
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And I’ll tell you something else that we did as part of our campaign… we 
trawled the Internet ourselves for alternative technologies to incineration and 
we came up with several, one of which as a company called _____ (company 
name). We got them to come over to Ireland and we personally drove them 
down to the EPA with a view to letting them know that there were alternatives 
to incineration to solve the waste.54 
 
We believe in creating positive responses to waste management.55  
The interviewee went on to say: 
We’re not proposing this as an alternative to incineration at all, there is no 
‘magic machine’ or anything, but it is an alternative and incineration is not the 
only answer because ____   (company name) have alternatives that should 
be looked at, should be examined. We did that type of thing. We didn’t say 
‘we don’t want an incinerator in our backyard’. We said ‘look here’s what you 
can do instead’. We are very proactive and that is part of what we did. I 
mean… I took a day off work to bring these two visitors down to the EPA. So 
they certainly can’t accuse us of NIMBYism’.56  
 
What was most noticeable was that this campaign – once successful in its main objective of stopping 
the incinerator- moved on to develop an integrated waste management scheme for the area based 
squarely on recycling.  So what began as a particularistic ‘local’ campaign became a general, more 
proactive long-term movement to create a sustainable environment.  Not surprisingly, local residents 
felt that “[t]here is no lead from the politicians… the will just isn’t there…”57 
 
Indeed, as one resident told us: 
The whole single-minded focus of this government seems to be to get 
incineration going quickly.  And if the county councils won’t push it through, 
then the central government will intervene and create a greater authority, 
whether it’s a greater Dublin authority or a north-eastern authority, and get it 
in there.  Because they see it perhaps as a cheaper alternative to landfills…. I 
don’t really know what their justification is but it’s a blind propaganda 
campaign from all angles.58 
 
What is most remarkable is the extent to which the supposedly independent EPA in Ireland has also 
failed to lead on this matter.  In 2002 the new Director General of the EPA declared that one of the 
EPA’s difficulties in entering the public debate on waste disposal is that the Agency must adjudicate 
on licenses for incinerators so “taking a stand may compromise our ability to say yes or no”.59  But the 
Director General of the state body charged with protecting the environment does, indeed, take a 
stand: “[p]ersonally, I would prefer to live beside an incinerator than a landfill site”.60  Yet as our case 
study showed most people when faced with the prospect prefer to say “No to both the landfill and the 
incinerator”. 
 
In speaking to other actors contesting waste management plans outside the case study area there 
was considerable worry about the influence of commercial interests, specifically waste companies 
coming into the globalized waste market.   The key worry from the environmentalists and local 
community activists was the role of ‘big business’, i.e. incineration companies, in the implementation of 
the plan.  They argued that there had been aggressive attempts by incinerator companies to lobby the 
government61 and to lead strategy. As one put it “the incineration industry is a bit of a dying industry 
and so they are looking for new avenues, they are looking for new places to go to build them, so 
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they’re looking to Eastern Europe and Ireland”.62  This concurs with O’Brien’s interpretation of the 
waste industry where he argues: 
This is a market whose rational economic actors are begging, cajoling, 
threatening and coercing the states of Europe to intervene politically into the 
circulation of wastes precisely because the ‘spontaneous’ emergence of 
markets does not generate the values they want out of the rubbish heap.63 
 
It was felt by many of our respondents that while the United States and Japan were trying to get away 
from incineration, Europe was lagging behind because there were ‘vested interests’ to be protected.  
The incineration companies were ‘well known’ as multinationals, but they could “set up subsidiary 
companies” in Ireland. The environmentalists were paralleling the previous problem in the nation-
states of local authorities acquiring and mismanaging landfill sites (i.e. the so-called ‘planning’ of 
‘dumping’), with the newer response of building incinerators. “Okay so we can’t dump everything 
anymore, so let’s just burn it” was the analysis.  They believed that in both cases the government was 
‘being wooed by or was wooing’ large international companies and taking little responsibility for 
negative impacts on localized communities.64 
 
The transnational linkages that inform national social movements and state-based issue actors 
demonstrate that subjects and spaces are formed in the interstices of complex political spaces that 
transcend national boundaries and state institutions.65  The negative view of incineration held by local 
communities, environmental campaigners and the environmental scientists was one informed by 
global flows of knowledge, political and technological, through mobile campaigners and cyberpolitics.  
The Irish government had turned to the ‘experts’, the engineers, for a technical fix to the waste issue.  
An assumption was that they were the technocrats who held the key to the embedded knowledge and 
information of waste management.  The surprising nature of the local action response was that it 
managed to link up, with a push of a button on the keyboard, to the cyberpolitics of international 
protest against waste.  There was in practice a time-space intensification that aided the ‘local’ 
response to a threat to the environment.  The local action response was networked to a virtual 
community that could serve to disembed technical waste information and democratize it, taking it 
beyond ‘professional’ discourses.   
 
Most interesting then, above the fact that the new electronic media made possible a new kind of 
environmentalist - networked, flexible, media-orientated action - is the interplay in the Irish situation 
between the politics of cyberspace and the politics of place.  It is the dynamic interplay of these politics 
that makes them potentially most effective.  As Escobar describes it, cyberpolitics can be effective if it 
fulfils two conditions: awareness of the dominant worlds (in this case the world of consumerism) and 
an ongoing tacking back and forth between cyberpolitics and political activism in the place where the 
activist resides66.  The concept, or context, of semi-periphery allows us to situate the politics of 
resistance to current waste management practices.  The examples of incipient cyberpolitics and the 
ongoing collective action against incinerators are part of a general trend, might also be seen as typical 
of the semi-periphery where the issues are at their sharpest and the resources to contest are there.  
That is to say, there is not only an awareness of what is wrong with the system but, also, there is a 
social, political and organizational capacity to resist.  The ‘politics of scale’ in Ireland can thus only be 
conceived of in terms of Ireland’s structural semi-peripheral condition. 
 
There is now a growing body of evidence that electronic networks can be used to foster collective 
action.  I am not referring here to electronic communication within an already existing transnational 
network of women, workers or environmentalists.  Rather, I refer to these place-bound communities 
that Castells and others seem to see as somehow static and lost in the whirlwind of globalization.  
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Thus Christopher Mele67 reports on the use of the Internet to build effective collective action in a low-
income public housing development in North Carolina.  Mele refers to how “The flexibility of the 
Internet proved useful in developing a surrogate electronic community and network and breaking down 
the isolation of Jervay and its residents”.68  Something similar can be seen in the Irish anti-incineration 
campaigns.  There is evidence that global forces and global connections, in this case may have 
inspired “social movements to seize control over their immediate but also their more distant worlds, 
challenging the mythology of an inexorable, runaway world”69 as Burawoy puts it.  
 
However, we need to bear in mind the enduring power of more traditional mediums such as 
newspapers and especially television where the general population was effectively being convinced 
that indeed, there is no alternative to incineration.  The neo-liberal discourse in relation to waste is no 
doubt a dominant one.  Forfás, the National Policy and Advisory Board for Enterprise, Trade, Science, 
Technology and Innovation set up to advise the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment on 
matters relating to the development of industry in the state, entered the fracas of waste governance in 
2001 issuing a report titled   Key Waste Management Issues in Ireland, 2001 (The Republic of 
Ireland).  This [document?] sets waste management clearly in the context of industrial development 
where waste facilities are seen as “a factor towards the end” of maintaining competitiveness in the 
State’s industrial policy.70  The report, according to the Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) Mary Harney, 
is “timely and welcome as a reasoned contribution to the current debate” [my italics].71  It does not 
take a social scientist to point out that waste management is a contested terrain in Ireland today -it is 
quite unavoidable if you read the paper or listen to the news- but it appears that it does take a 
sociologist to contextualize waste in anything other than a framework of industrial ‘competitiveness’ 
and profitability. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Radical analysis in the era of globalization might be best served by producing ‘critical grounded’ 
studies which may help link up different ‘places’ in the global political economy.  We have seen in the 
past the model of the radical ‘legislator’ who uncovers the ‘laws’ of capitalist development and then the 
Gramscian ‘organic intellectual’ tied umbilically to a social movement.  Today we might need to take a 
more mobile, travelling, or interpretative role to be effective.  Michael Burawoy refers in this regard to 
“the ethnographic archaeologist who seeks out local experiments, new institutional forms, real utopias 
if you wish, who places them in context, translates them into a common language and links them one 
to another across the globe”.72  This travelling ethnographer would be ‘grounded’ and she would, 
hopefully, be imbued with the spirit of social transformation. 
 
Apart from the specific issue of waste management, a major theme I see flowing from the above study 
is the issue of multi-scalar governance.  The recent debates on the ‘politics of scale’73 seem to provide 
a powerful analytical tool to analyse the issues of globalization, semi-peripherality and the 
environment.  Social interactions are seen to have a spatial or geographical structure.  The 
households in the small rural community we used as a case study for an anti-incinerator campaign 
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(see above) relate to national political structures, macro-regional European dimensions and to the 
global environmental movement.  The campaign against the proposed incinerator was successful in 
‘jumping scales’ and making global alliances for a ‘local’ campaign.  Yet the politics of scale is more 
than a ‘level’ of analysis and needs to be seen “as a relational element in a complex mix that also 
includes space, place and environment – all of which interactively make the geographies we live in”.74  
This is a problematic which could usefully illuminate the waste management processes I have 
discussed above. 
 
The politics of scale may provide us with a more nuanced way of understanding local politics but also 
of how governance is today, inevitably, a ‘multi-scalar’ process.  Waste management as we saw is 
both local and global at the same time, while the main ‘driver’ at policy level seemed to be the macro-
regional European level.  The campaigns against the Irish government’s incinerator-based waste 
management strategy were inevitably place-specific.  This approach focused on the uneven 
development of scale and its social dimensions certainly takes us beyond the categories of core, 
periphery and semi-periphery, which once prevailed but is compatible with the more nuanced 
approach taken in this issue of CNS I believe.  It is in keeping with the complexity of social life under 
late capitalism, which cannot be pigeonholed too neatly.  As Neil Brenner puts it, these debates on the 
politics of scale provide “an important theoretical lens through which to begin to decipher the dramatic 
and highly unsettling processes of rescaling –of capital, of the territorial state and of social power 
relations more generally- that are occurring throughout the world system in the current era of 
‘glocalization’”.75 
 
Does Ireland’s semi-peripherality then create a specific dynamic for waste management politics?  
While an economic boom has undoubtedly eased core-periphery tensions within the EU it has also 
heightened some contradictions.  As we saw above Ireland’s semi-peripheral status provided the 
impetus for a dependent but real level of development since the 1990s.  However, the ecological 
consequences of this were simply not faced by a semi-periphery state that refused to take 
responsibility and simply responded passively to EU Directives on the matter.  Ireland’s continued 
dependence on the structures of ‘Empire’  has created a dependent political structure and outlook.  
Characteristic of this, as we saw above, is a total failure to engage with strategic long-term thinking on 
a vital issue for sustainable development such as waste management.  As we found in our interviews 
at a high level within the Irish state there was a simple forlorn hope that, once again, Ireland could 
obtain ‘derogation’ (be excused) from the various pressing European Directives on waste 
management in a typical semi-peripheral dependent manner. 
 
If Ireland is a ‘branch economy’ of the US then its political managers will inevitably tend to run the 
country like a corporation.  Issues of legitimacy and democracy are translated into the language of 
cost-benefit analysis.  Waste is an issue to be tackled as expeditiously as possible: if we can no longer 
bury it in the ground then we should burn it; if the electorate do not like this then we should ‘educate’ 
them better.  While the managers of the state can keep the economy booming and ‘dividends’ are paid 
out regularly to the ‘share-holders’ in the national economy, this system may be stable in the short-
term.  However, it is now clear to all that not only is the economic boom fragile (because it is 
dependent on US economy swings), but time-limited (already it is faltering).  Then in the next three to 
four years Ireland is due to become a net contributor to the EU, instead of being the extremely well-
looked-after state it has been to date.  This is another contradiction of the economic boom and one 
whose consequences have not been faced to date.  Again, semi-peripheral ‘success’ as in Ireland not 
only brings disastrous eco-social consequences, but it is also notoriously unsustainable even within its 
own narrow logic. 
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